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We consider three broad classes of quantum secret sharing with and without eavesdropping and show how
a graph state formalism unifies otherwise disparate quantum secret sharing models. In addition to the elegant
unification provided by graph states, our approach provides a generalization of threshold classical secret sharing
via insecure quantum channels beyond the current requirement of 100% collaboration by players to just a simple
majority in the case of five players. Another innovation here is the introduction of embedded protocols within a
larger graph state that serves as a one-way quantum information processing system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing is one of the most important information-
theoretically secure cryptographic protocols and is germane
to online auctions, electronic voting, shared electronic bank-
ing, and cooperative activation of bombs. Although first for-
mulated and solved in classical information terms [1], two di-
rections have been followed in the quantum case: classical se-
cret sharing with quantum enhancement of channels to protect
against eavesdropping [2] (and experimentally realized [3])
and protecting quantum information as an application of quan-
tum error correction [4] (and experimentally realized in the
‘continuous variable’ Gaussian state case [5]).
In secret sharing, a dealer wishes to transmit a secret, which
can be a bit string or a qubit string and deals an encoded ver-
sion of this secret to n players such that some subsets of play-
ers can collaborate to reconstruct the secret and all other sub-
sets are denied any information whatsoever about the secret.
The access structure is the set of all subsets of players that can
obtain the secret, and the adversary structure is the set of all
subsets of players that are completely denied the secret.
In threshold secret sharing, each player receives precisely
one equal share of the encoded secret, and a threshold num-
ber of any players k can collaborate to reconstruct the secret
whereas every subset of fewer than k players is denied any
information at all: this scheme is referred to as (k, n) thresh-
old secret sharing and is a primitive protocol by which any
information-theoretic secret sharing protocol can be achieved.
In each case the channel can be classical or quantum de-
pending on context. A private channel is an authenticated
channel that is impervious to eavesdropping. A public chan-
nel is an authenticated channel that is open to eavesdropping.
Mathematically channels are described by completely positive
trace-preserving mappings, even for classical channels as clas-
sical information processing can be embedded into a quantum
framework.
Our goals here are
(i) to formulate a secret sharing problem that allows both
classical and quantum channels, which can be private or
public,
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(ii) to introduce three subproblems that show how the orig-
inal classical secret sharing and the two versions of
quantum secret sharing fit into the general problem and
highlight the differences between these subproblems,
(iii) develop a graph state formalism [6] that unites these
subproblems into one elegant framework,
(iv) extend one class of subproblems concerning classical
secret sharing in insecure public channels beyond the
existing security proofs that require 100% collaboration
by the players, and
(v) introduce embedded secret sharing protocols for graph
states within one-way quantum computing, which could
serve as a first step towards implementing integrated se-
cret sharing protocols within quantum computing, e.g.
distributed measurement-based quantum computation
(MBQC) [7].
II. SECRET SHARING PROBLEM AND SUBPROBLEMS
To begin we formulate the general problem. The basic unit
of classical information is the bit, corresponding to {0, 1}, and
the basic unit of quantum information is the qubit, correspond-
ing to H2 = span{|0〉, |1〉}. Any message can be encoded in
a finite string of bits if the information is classical or in a fi-
nite string of qubits (perhaps entangled and could be pure or
mixed) if the ‘information’ is quantum.
Secret Sharing Problem: A dealer holds a se-
cret S, which is either a bit or a qubit, and must
send this secret to n players such that any k or
more players can reconstruct the secret, and all
sets of fewer than k players as well as eavesdrop-
pers are denied any access whatsoever to the se-
cret.
Remark. A secret that is longer than one bit or one qubit can
be shared by a distributed protocol that shares the string one
bit or qubit at a time.
Our new and general formulation of the secret sharing prob-
lem is meant to be helpful in that it incorporates various sce-
narios of secret sharing with quantum or classical channels
2that can be public or private, and the three major secret shar-
ing areas of study [1, 2, 4] are subproblems of this overarching
problem.
CC Classical secret sharing with private channels between
the dealer and each player and private Classical chan-
nels shared between each pair of players;
CQ Classical secret sharing with public channels between
the dealer and each player and either Quantum or clas-
sical channels shared between each pair of players
QQ Quantum secret sharing wherein the dealer shares quan-
tum channels with each player, and these channels
can be private or public, and the players share either
Quantum or classical private channels between each
other.
As secret sharing is information-theoretically secure, the
distribution of a classical secret message is completely se-
cure without the need for quantum information, in contrast
to quantum key distribution [8], which catapults key distri-
bution over public channels to information-theoretic security
from the classical limited computational-security guarantee.
Thus case CC [1] is resolved fully by classical information
processing, but we embed CC into a graph state description.
Case CQ considers quantum-enhanced protection from
eavesdropping over public channels and was first studied for
(2, 2) threshold secret sharing [2, 9, 10] and extended to (n, n)
threshold secret sharing [11]. The quantum enhancement is
achieved by random key distribution enabled via quantum pu-
rification.
The third case QQ deals with the sharing of quantum infor-
mation [4], as opposed to classical information in the first two
subproblems identified above. To distinguish this case from
the first two cases, the term ‘quantum state sharing’ is some-
times used [5]. In contrast to CQ, which is only solved for
the (n, n) threshold secret sharing case, this quantum infor-
mation version in private channels is fully general in the sense
that the general (k, n) case has been solved as an application
of quantum error correction.
In summary our graph state formalism unifies known re-
sults concerning (n, n) CQ plus QQ for higher-dimensional
stabilizer states, and adds new results, including (3, 5) CQ.
We expect that our new approach to all forms of quantum se-
cret sharing in the literature will enable further advances be-
cause of the elegance and unifying properties of this formal-
ism.
III. GRAPH STATES
Graph states provide a superb resource for secret sharing,
as we show. The advantages of using graph states in this work
are threefold. First, they are the most readily available multi-
partite resource states in the laboratory at present, with graph
states of up to 6 qubits already built and used for informa-
tion processing experimentally [12, 13], and many proposals
for their implementation in various systems. Second, they are
natural candidates for integration of different tasks, since they
are the main state resource in almost all multipartite quantum
information processing tasks, including measurement-based
quantum computation and error correction (hence the large ef-
fort to make them). Third, they allow for an elegant graphical
representation which offers an intuitive picture of information
flow, and also allow the possible use of graph theoretic results
to aid proofs and understanding.
In this work we employ graph states in the standard form [6]
plus two extensions. These extensions are actually quite sim-
ple (modification via local unitaries) and are intended to al-
low intuitive graphical understanding of how information is
encoded and spread over the graphs. The idea is that the se-
cret will be encoded onto classical labels placed on vertices of
the graph representing local operations. The inherent entan-
glement of the graph states allows these labels to be shifted
around, allowing us to see graphically which sets of players
can access the secrets and which cannot (explicitly written as
properties P1-P4, see e.g. Fig. 2). We will give several exam-
ples along the way to make it clear.
We will begin by defining these extended ‘labeled’ graph
states in Subsec. III A, followed by describing the graphical
rules of how they are used to spread information and how
it can be accessed in Subsec. III B, finishing with how they
change under measurements in Subsec. III C.
A. Labeled graph states
A pure graph state is a state in the Hilbert space H⊗n2 , i.e. a
string of n qubits. For |±〉 = (|0〉±|1〉)/√2 and an undirected
graph G = (V,E) comprising n vertices, with
V = {vi}, E = {eij = (vi, vj)} (3.1)
the set of n vertices and the set of edges, respectively.
Definition 1. Two players i and j are ‘neighbours’ iff there
exists an edge eij that connects their respective vertices vi
and vj .
The set of i’s neighbours is denoted Ni.
A graph state is created from an initial state
|+〉⊗n = H⊗n |0〉⊗n , H = |+〉 〈0|+ |−〉 〈1| , (3.2)
with H the Hadamard transformation, by applying the two-
qubit controlled-phase gate
CZ|ǫǫ′〉 = (−1)ǫǫ′ |ǫǫ′〉, ǫ, ǫ′ ∈ {0, 1}, |ǫǫ′〉 ∈ H⊗22 (3.3)
to all pairs of qubits whose corresponding vertices on the
graph are joined by an edge and not to any pair not connected
by an edge. The commutativity of all CZ operations implies
that the order of applying CZ gates is unimportant:
|G〉 =
∏
e∈E
CZe|+〉⊗n. (3.4)
We now modify the graph labeling. The usual graph state
has each node labeled by its vertex index; in other words the
3label of vertex vi is the index i, which has a bit string length
of O(log n). We append to this label three more bits so the
label of vertex vi is (i, ℓi1, ℓi2, ℓi3) for each ℓij ∈ {0, 1}.
The first two labels are used to describe classical informa-
tion spread over the state. Over all vertices, we define the vec-
tors ~ℓi⋆ = (ℓi1, ℓi2) for the ith vertex, ~ℓ⋆j = (ℓ1j , ℓ2j , . . . , ℓnj)
for the j th bit over all n vertices, and
~ℓ = (~ℓ1⋆, ~ℓ2⋆, . . . , ~ℓn⋆). (3.5)
Graphically these labels will be attached to their vertices and
used to represent the spreading of classical information. If a
vertex vi has no label, this is equivalent to setting ~ℓi⋆ = (0, 0).
The third additional bit ℓi3 occurs in the security of proto-
cols, and is not relevant to the classical information transmit-
ted. For the ease of graphical manipulation of the encoded
information, we absorb this bit into the graph itself. Graphi-
cally the third bit ℓi3 is depicted as the vertex vi being either
a # (the set of which is denoted V#), for ℓi3 = 0, or a  (the
set of which is denoted V), for ℓi3 = 1. The vertex set is
thus a union of two types of vertices,
V = V# ∪ V. (3.6)
We thus have the extended graphs G = (V#,V,E).
These extra labels imply the action of local unitary opera-
tions (hence maintaining entanglement properties) via the fol-
lowing definition.
Definition 2. The ‘labeled graph state’, is obtained from the
graph state |G〉 by
∣∣G~ℓ〉 =⊗
i
(
Xℓi1i Z
ℓi2
i
)
|G〉
|G〉 =
⊗
j|vj∈V 
Sj |G〉 (3.7)
for
X =|0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|,
Z =|0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|, (3.8)
S =|0〉〈0| − i|1〉〈1|.
Remark. The partial phase shift gate S is used to perform
an X ↔ Y basis transformation for protection against eaves-
dropping, analogous to the BB84 strategy [8].
For encoding purposes, only local Z gates are required, so
we introduce another kind of graph state.
Definition 3. The ‘encoded graph state’ is
|G~ℓ⋆2〉 =
⊗
i
Zℓi2i |G〉. (3.9)
Thus the encoded graph state is also a labeled graph state
with ℓ1i = 0 for all i, |G~ℓ⋆2〉 = |G~ℓ=(0,ℓ12,0,ℓ22,...,0,ℓn2)〉.
Encoded graph states exhibit the orthonormality property〈
G~ℓ⋆2
∣∣G~ℓ′⋆2
〉
= δ~ℓ⋆2~ℓ′⋆2
. (3.10)
FIG. 1: (Color online) Labeled graph with vertex v1, depicted
as 1 inside a , which indicates that S has been applied to this
vertex, and vertices v2 and v3, depicted as the numerals 2 and 3
inside #. The labels ~ℓi⋆ = (ℓi1, ℓi2) indicate that operation
Xℓi1Zℓi2 have been applied to each qubit j, respectively. For
~ℓi⋆ ≡ (0, ℓi2) ∀i, this labeled graph state corresponds to the encoded
state |G~ℓ⋆2〉 = Z
ℓ12
1
⊗ Zℓ22
2
⊗ Zℓ32
3
(|0 + +〉+ i|1−−〉) /√2
(Eqn. (3.13)).
Encoded graph states |G~ℓ⋆2〉 can be elegantly expressed in
the stabilizer formalism. For Y = iXZ and stabilizer opera-
tors for any ith vertex denoted by
K#i = Xi ⊗ei,j∈E Zj , Ki = Yi ⊗ei,j∈E Zj , (3.11)
(for circular and square vertices respectively) the encoded
state |G~ℓ⋆2〉 is completely specified by eigenequations
K#,i |G~ℓ⋆2〉 = (−1)ℓi2 |G~ℓ⋆2〉 ∀i ∈ V. (3.12)
The following two examples, for three and for four qubits,
respectively, explain how the stabilizers define the encoded
graph states.
Example 1. The three-qubit labeled graph state presented in
Fig. 1 is the encoded graph state
|G~ℓ⋆2〉 = Z
ℓ12
1 ⊗ Zℓ222 ⊗ Zℓ323
( |0 + +〉+ i|1−−〉√
2
)
,
(3.13)
and is the unique common eigenstate of
K1 =Y1 ⊗ Z2 ⊗ Z3
K#2 =Z1 ⊗X2 ⊗ 1 3
K#3 =Z1 ⊗ 1 2 ⊗X3, (3.14)
with eigenvalues ~ℓ⋆2 = (l12, l22, l32).
A four-qubit encoded graph state is given in the fol-
lowing example. First we define the n-qubit Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger-Mermin (nGHZM) graph and corresponding
nGHZM graph state.
4Definition 4. The nGHZM graph for vertex vi is the degree n
graph
GnGHZM = (V = {vj},E = {(v1, vj 6=i)}) , (3.15)
and the nGHZM graph state is the state corresponding to
|GnGHZM〉.
Example 2. The 4GHZM graph is depicted in Fig. 2(a), and
the corresponding encoded 4GHZM graph state is
|G~ℓ⋆2〉 =Zℓ12 ⊗ Zℓ22 ⊗ Zℓ32 ⊗ Zℓ42 |G〉, (3.16)
|G〉 = 1√
2
(|0 + ++〉+ |1−−−〉) ,
and is fully defined by the four stabilizers
K#1 =X ⊗ Z ⊗ Z ⊗ Z, K#2 = Z ⊗X ⊗ 1 ⊗ 1 ,
K#3 =Z ⊗ 1 ⊗X ⊗ 1 , K#4 = Z ⊗ 1 ⊗ 1 ⊗X, (3.17)
with eigenvalues ~ℓ⋆2 = (l12, l22, l32, l42).
B. Dependence and Access
We first consider sharing a classical secret; sharing quan-
tum secrets follows from this as we will see later. Each qubit
represented by a vertex in the graph is held by one player, and
the classical secret is encoded into the label ~ℓ⋆2. A subset of
players is represented by a vertex subset V′ ⊂ V.
For general labeled graph states, all accessible information
for V′ resides in the reduced state obtained from the labeled
graph state (3.7):
ρ
V′~ℓ = TrV/V′ |G~ℓ〉〈G~ℓ|. (3.18)
In the context of secret sharing, it is important to know what
information about ~ℓ is contained in ρ
V′~ℓ. The information
shared between ρ
V′~ℓ and ~ℓ exhibits two important properties:
A1 Bit dependence:– ρ
V′~ℓ is dependent on bit k if ρV′~ℓ is
not invariant under a flip of the kth bit.
A2 Bit access:– Bit k is accessible if there exists a mea-
surement protocol such that one copy of ρ
V′~ℓ reveals
the value of bit k with certainty.
A2⇒A1, but A1;A2. Given dependency on a bit, it is espe-
cially useful to know what information can be obtained by V′
via local operations and classical communication (LOCC) or
via quantum channels.
Graphically we ascertain the dependancy of a set of players
V
′ on the information by shuffling bits between neighbours:
that is, exploiting equivalences between labeled graph states
with different labels ~ℓ. If a label does not occur on one of the
vertices in the set V′, that set has no dependency on it. This is
obvious because the label would then represent a local unitary
operation outside the set V′, which cannot affect the reduced
density matrix ρ
V′~ℓ. We thus look for equivalences between
FIG. 2: (Color online) Equivalence of labeled graph states depict-
ing bit dependence for four players. (a) The initial four party en-
coded graph state corresponds to ~ℓi⋆ = (0, li2). (b) Equivalent
state with ~ℓ1⋆ = (0, 0), ~ℓ2⋆ = (0, l22), ~ℓ3⋆ = (0, l32), and ~ℓ4⋆ =
(l12, l42) (see Eqn. (3.19)): bit ℓ12 has been shuffled from vertex 1
to vertex 4, which is indicated by the arrow in the figure. (c) Equiv-
alent state with bit ℓ22 shuffled to the other parties: ~ℓ1⋆ = (ℓ22, l12),
~ℓ2⋆ = (0, 0), ~ℓ3⋆ = (0, ℓ22 ⊕ l32), and ~ℓ4⋆ = (0, l22 ⊕ l42) as
indicated by arrows and labels (see Eqn. (3.20)). NOTE: vertex vi
without label is equivalent to setting ~ℓi⋆ = (0, 0).
labeled graph states where labels can be shuffled outside V′
as much as possible. Of course different ~ℓ⋆2-labeled graph
states, equivalently encoded graph states, must be inequivalent
because of the orthonormality relation (3.10); indeed this is
why we need the ~ℓ⋆1 labels.
Then the next step is to ascertain if the desired informa-
tion can be accessed by V′, which is effected by a measure-
ment protocol corresponding to appropriate combinations of
Ki (3.11), then exploiting the eigenequation relations (3.12).
Fortunately the graph readily reveals the appropriate way
to do this. Before giving the general rules, we begin with a
four-qubit example.
Example 3. A dealer distributes the encoded graph
state (3.16) to all four players V = {v1, v2, v3, v4} depicted
in Fig. 2(a). In this example we show that, if the three players
in V′ = {v1, v2, v3} collaborate, they learn two bits (ℓ22, ℓ32)
of the four-bit encoding and are entirely denied knowledge
of two other bits (ℓ12, ℓ42), whether they use shared quan-
tum channels or only LOCC. We also see that just two players
V
′′ = {v2, v3} can (and can only) acquire ℓ22⊕ℓ32 via LOCC,
where ⊕ is summation mod 2.
Acting upon the encoded graph state (3.16) by the fourth
stabilizer of Eq. (3.17) yields
K#ℓ124 |G ~ℓ⋆2〉 =1 1 ⊗ Z
ℓ22
2 ⊗ Zℓ323 ⊗Xℓ124 Zℓ424 |G〉
=
∣∣∣G~ℓ=(0,0,0,ℓ22,0,ℓ32,ℓ12,ℓ42)
〉
=(−1)ℓ12ℓ42 |G ~ℓ⋆2〉. (3.19)
The player subset V′ = {v1, v2, v3} is thus independent of ℓ12
because local unitary dependence on ℓ12 has been shuffled to
5player v4’s two-bit label ~ℓ4⋆. In Fig. 2(b), this ℓ12 bit shuf-
fle is depicted as a green arrow from vertex v1 to vertex v4.
Vertex v1 is unlabeled because its bit value is now zero, and
vertex v4 now has a two-bit label ~ℓ4⋆ = (ℓ12, ℓ42). The graph
states in Figs. 2(a) and 2(b) are thus equivalent up to (an irrel-
evant) global phase.
Players in V′ share a reduced state that is dependent on
bits ℓ22, ℓ32. In fact they can perform measurements corre-
sponding to K#2 and K
#
3 to learn these two bits according
to (3.12). With shared quantum channels, there is no prob-
lem in performing such a joint measurement as K#2 and K#3
commute and have support only on operations by players in
V
′
. However quantum channels are not required: the players
can learn (ℓ22, ℓ32) by LOCC because the stabilizers commute
locally. In contradistinction a failure of local commutation
would imply that these bits could not be learned by LOCC.
In fact a smaller set of players can access information. Con-
sider the set of players V′′ = {v2, v3}. Applying eigenopera-
tor K#ℓ221 yields
K#ℓ221
∣∣∣G~ℓ⋆2
〉
=Xℓ22Zℓ12 ⊗ 1
⊗ Zℓ22+ℓ32 ⊗ Zℓ22+ℓ42 |G〉
=
∣∣∣G~ℓ=(ℓ22,ℓ12,0,0,0,ℓ22⊕ℓ32,0,ℓ22⊕ℓ42)
〉
=(−1)ℓ12ℓ22
∣∣∣G~ℓ⋆2
〉
(3.20)
This implies that the reduced density matrix only depends on
ℓ22 ⊕ ℓ32. This information can be accessed by measuring
K#2 K
#
3 = 1 ⊗X ⊗X ⊗ 1 . (3.21)
This can be done by LOCC. This shuffling is illustrated in
Fig. 2(c); hence all graph states in Figs. 2(a) to 2(c) are equiv-
alent.
Remark. Stabilizer operators K#i (and products thereof) are
not directly measured by the players under LOCC; rather
players locally measure in the Xi, Yi = iXiZi, or Zi bases to
obtain one-bit outcomes sXi , sYi , and sZi , respectively, where
sαi is assigned the value 0 if the measurement outcome is 1,
and 1 if the measurement outcome is −1.
Then the bit value outcome for the measurement of K#2
and K#3 in Example 3 is
ℓ22 = s
Z
1 ⊕ sX2 , ℓ32 = sZ1 ⊕ sX3 , (3.22)
respectively. Henceforth when we say players can locally
measure an operator, we mean measurement in the sense that
local Pauli measurements can be performed and resultant bit
outcomes combined to learn the same as if nonlocal stabilizer
measurements were performed.
For Example 3, each player’s qubit corresponded to a #
vertex. Extending to  vertices is straightforward by using
the Ki stabilizers (3.11). Specifically if a vertex is modified
by changing its graph representation from a # to a , in the
stabilizers an X is changed to a Y and we have a correspond-
ing change to the bit transfer.
Example 4. For Examples 2 and 3 let the # representation of
vertex v1 be changed to a  in Fig. 2(a). Thus, in Fig. 2(c), the
resultant bit pair on vertex v1 is ~ℓ1⋆ = (ℓ22, ℓ12⊕ ℓ22) instead
of ~ℓ1⋆ = (ℓ22, ℓ12) because modifying X 7→ Y = iXZ in
the revised stabilizer K#1 7→ K1 yields an extra Z operation
leading to ⊕1 on the second bit (via the appropriate change
to Eq, (3.20)). The others remain the same ~ℓ3⋆ = (0, ℓ2⊕ ℓ3),
~ℓ4⋆ = (0, ℓ2 ⊕ ℓ4).
These examples for four qubits are generalizable to n qubits
with # or  vertices. Here are the general principles for
accessibility and dependence of information in an encoded
graph state.
Proposition 1. The following principles hold for encoded
graphs states |G~ℓ⋆2〉.
P1 The encoded graph state |G~ℓ⋆2〉 with one-bit label li2
on vertex vi is equivalent to the labeled graph state
|G~ℓ〉 where vertex vi is relabeled 0 and a neighbour-
ing vertex vj is relabeled either ~ℓj⋆ = (ℓi2, ℓj2) or
~ℓj⋆ = (ℓi2, ℓj2⊕ℓi2), depending on whether vertex vi is
of the type # or , respectively. The remaining neigh-
bours of vj , vk ∈ Ni are relabeled (0, ℓk2⊕ ℓi2). In this
way any neighbour of vi can shuffle the dependency of
ℓi2 to itself and to its remaining neighbours. Bit shuf-
fling is depicted as green arrows and shows how depen-
dence of the reduced state on bit labels can be trans-
ferred from one player to another.
P2 The bit value ℓi2 is accessible by players in set V′ if and
only if vi and all its neighbours Ni are in the set V′.
P3 If the set V′ comprises an even number of players, and
all their external neighbours (outside the set V′) are
neighbours of each and every player in V′, then the sum
(mod 2) of all their one-bit labels {ℓi2} is accessible,
i.e. they can collaborate to find
ℓi2 ⊕ ℓj2...⊕ ℓm2, vi, vj , ..., vm ∈ V′.
P4 If P2 holds, and players in the set share quantum chan-
nels, all information encoded in one-bit labels is acces-
sible. If the set shares only classical channels, and P2
holds, then information accessibility is limited because
neighbours vi and vj in the set can only learn either ℓi2
or ℓj2 but not both, but vi and vj in the set can learn
both ℓi2 and ℓj2 if they are not immediate neighbours.
NOTE: The bit shuffling in P1 is not active; rather it recog-
nizes equivalence between labeled graph states.
Proof. All proofs are simply derived from eigenequa-
tions (3.11) and (3.12), which shuffles bits between play-
ers, thereby revealing actual dependence of reduced states on
given bit labels {ℓi2}.
For P1, suppose vertex vi has a neighbouring vertex vj
which is either a # or a . Then
6|G~ℓ⋆2〉 =(−1)ℓi2ℓj2K
#ℓi2
j |G~ℓ⋆2〉 = (−1)ℓi2ℓj21 i ⊗ Z
ℓj2
j X
ℓi2
j ⊗(vk,vj)∈E Z(ℓk2+ℓj2)k ⊗m 6=i,j;(vm,vj)/∈E Z lm2m |G〉,
|G~ℓ⋆2〉 =(−1)ℓi2ℓj2K
ℓi2
j |G~ℓ⋆2〉 = (−1)ℓi2ℓj2 i1 i ⊗ Z
li2⊕ℓj2
j X
ℓi2
j ⊗(vk,vj)∈E Z(ℓk2+ℓj2)k ⊗m 6=i,j;(vm,vj)/∈E Zℓm2m |G〉, (3.23)
respectively. Evidently dependency on ℓi2 is shuffled from
neighbour vi to vj , and vj ’s other neighbours are as described
in P1.
For P2, players obtain ℓi2 by measuring K#,i of (3.11)
and (3.12). Because K#,i is nontrivial on i and also on Ni,
by (3.11), player i and all of Ni must collaborate to mea-
sure ℓi2, and this collaboration is sufficient.
For P3 we start by looking at the case V′ contains only two
players. By (3.11) if all neighbours of pair vi, vj ∈ V′ are
either in the set, or shared outside the set, K#,i · K#,j is
nontrivial only inside the set, and thus can be measured by the
members of the set. This is true since all the Z from theK#,i
cancel with the Z from K#,j on their common neighbours.
Applying K#,i ·K#,j to (3.12), we see that this yields ℓi2⊕
ℓj2. Similarly this holds for any even number of players.
For the comparison of LOCC to the fully quantum case
of P4, by the above logic if properties P2 and P3 hold, then the
dependency on the associated observables are nontrivial only
within the set. As all operators K#,i commute, all observ-
ables commute in the nontrivial set, and hence can be mea-
sured by global operations.
For LOCC, it is clear from (3.11) that, if vertices vi and vj
are neighbours, then K#,i and K
#,
j share different local
Pauli operators on i and j hence cannot be simultaneously
measured locally; therefore, even if P2 holds, one must choose
one measurement or the other. If vertices vi and vj are not
neighbours, they are indeed amenable to simultaneous local
measurements. Similar statements can be made when P3
holds, but are more complicated graphically and must be taken
case by case.
C. Local Z and Y measurements on encoded graph states
In our protocols encoded graph states with both  and #
vertices arise as a result of performing either Y or Z mea-
surements on qubits identified by vertices of the labeled graph
with only circular vertices. Local Pauli measurements on
graph states are described by a simple set of rules, which read-
ily yield the resultant states [6]. These rules were originally
stated in terms of graph states up to local unitary operations.
For our purposes we would like to incorporate also these lo-
cal unitary operations into the labeled graph states. We now
represent these rules exactly graphically for the Z and Y mea-
surements, using the labeled graphs above, with no local uni-
tary ambiguity.
If a Z measurement is made on vertex vi of an encoded
graph state with circular vertices, the resultant state corre-
sponds to a labeled graph state of the original graph but with
FIG. 3: (Color online) When Pauli Z and Y measurements are made
on vertex v1, graphs (a) and (b) metamorphose into (a′) and (b′),
respectively. Outcomes Sαi = 0, 1 correspond to measurement
eigenvalues −1,+1 respectively, and are incorporated into the labels
in (a′) and (b′).
vertex vi and its edges deleted. For outcome sZi , the labels of
all vertices in Ni change to ~ℓj⋆ 7→ (0, ℓj2 ⊕ sZi ). We denote
the resultant graph by g.
If a Y measurement is made on vertex vi of an encoded
graph state with circular vertices, the resultant state is a la-
beled graph state obtained by applying the following four
steps to the original graph; the new graph is denoted g′.
S1 Perform local complementation on vi: all existing edges
between elements in Ni are removed, and where they
did not exist, they are added.
S2 Each # vertex in Ni is changed to .
S3 For outcome sYi , the labels on the neighbours of i
change to ℓj⋆ = (0, ℓj2)→ (0, ℓj2 ⊕ ℓi2 ⊕ sYi )
S4 Remove vertex i and all its edges.
Example 5. A Z and a Y measurement on vertex v1 of a
square graph state with circular vertices changes the graphs
as depicted in Fig. 3.
These rules can easily be understood by the fact that any
encoded graph state with labels ℓi2 = 0 ∀i can be written in
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|G(~0)〉 =
1√
2
(
|0〉1|g(0···0)〉2,...,n + |1〉1|g(1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈N1
0···0)〉2,...,n
)
=
eiπ/4√
2
(
|0′〉1|g′(0···0)〉2,...,n
− i|1′〉1|g′(1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈N1
0···0)
〉2,...,n
)
, (3.24)
with {|0〉, |1〉} and
{|0′〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 − i|1〉), |1′〉 = 1/√2(|0〉+ i|1〉)}
the eigenstates of the Z and Y Pauli operators, and the corre-
sponding eigenvalues are +1 and−1, respectively. Adding la-
bels ~ℓ⋆2 indicates the application of local Zs. This commutes
with measuring Pauli Z , so the labels carry forward only with
the addition of the correction from the measurement itself, e.g.
Fig. 3(a),(a’). However, local Z does not commute with a
Y measurement, hence the bit ℓ12 carries on to the measured
graph (S3), e.g. Fig. 3(b),(b’).
The following definition follows naturally.
Definition 5. Given a graphG with only circular vertices, and
associated encoded graph state |G~ℓ⋆2〉, the graph of the state
given by measuring Pauli Y on vertex i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is called
the conjugate graph denoted g′, with conjugate graph state de-
noted |g′〉1,...,n/i and can be found explicitly by following the
rules
R1 Perform local complementation on vi.
R2 Replace all neighbours of i with  vertices.
R3 Remove vi and all its edges.
It can easily be shown that encoded conjugate graph states
can be written as∣∣∣g′(0···0)
〉
=
e−iπ/4√
2
(
|g(0···0)〉+ |g(1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈N1
0···0)〉
)
∣∣∣∣g′(1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈N1
0···0)
〉
=
e−iπ/4√
2
(
|g(0···0)〉 − i|g(1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈N1
0···0)〉
)
(3.25)
so are effectively conjugate to the encoded graph states
{∣∣g(0···0)〉 , |g(1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈N1
0···0)〉}.
The following definitions are useful for Sec. V.
Definition 6. The nGHZM graph GnGHZMi is embedded in G
if GnGHZMi ⊂ G and Ni ∩ G\GnGHZMi = ∅.
Definition 7. The nGHZM graph state is embedded into state
|G〉 if GnGHZMi is embedded in G.
We now have the necessary formalism to develop the vari-
ous secret sharing protocols.
IV. SECRET SHARING PROTOCOLS
In this section we introduce our three secret sharing proto-
cols beginning with CC for sharing classical secrets in Sub-
sec. IV A. Using our graph state approach, we construct solu-
tions for each of (n, n), (3, 4) and (3, 5) threshold secret shar-
ing. These results provide a foundation for our subsequent
protocols: CQ in Subsec. IV B and QQ in Subsec. IV C.
A. CC
In the CC protocol, classical information is directly en-
coded into the bit string ~ℓ⋆2, i.e. onto the encoded graph
state {|G~ℓ⋆2〉} in a manner that enables certain sets of collab-
orating players to access concealed information according to
the principles of the secret sharing protocol.
Mathematically our protocol is similar to Gottesman’s [14]
wherein stabilizers are used to share classical secrets in quan-
tum states. A difference between our scheme and Gottesman’s
is that he uses mixed high-dimensional states whereas our
graph state approach enables use of pure states on qubits. An-
other difference with Gottesman’s approach is that our method
is not as general: our scheme works for a limited number of
(k, n) scenarios whereas Gottesman’s method works for any
(k, n). Although our scheme is more restrictive, it is appli-
cable to a restricted set of cases and importantly provides a
foundation for the protocols discussed in subsequent subsec-
tions.
The CC protocol steps are as follows:
CC1 The dealer encodes the secret bit string S into the clas-
sical information ~ℓ⋆2 and encodes this onto the n-qubit
state {|G~ℓ⋆2〉}.
CC2 The dealer sends each player one qubit.
CC3 An authorized set of players accesses the secret bit by
measuring appropriate stabilizer operators (prescribed
explicitly in each case).
Here we analyze the ability of sets of players to access this in-
formation for two cases: using LOCC and using full quantum
communication (FQC). We will see that each graph represents
a different sharing structure, and that the rules of access are
simple in graph terms, and show that some graphs can be used
as secret sharing schemes as set out in the introduction. In
particular we present schemes for (n, n), (3, 4) and (3, 5).
We now proceed to give explicit examples of how the de-
pendence and access properties in Sec. III B can be applied
to give secret sharing via the above protocol. We begin by
looking at the case of nGHZMi states. Using Property P1,
we can see in Fig. 4(a) that the player set {v1, . . . , vm} de-
pends only on bits ℓ22, . . . , ℓm2; i.e., the dependency on ℓ12
has been removed. From P2 it is possible for the same player
set to recover all ℓ22 . . . , ℓm2, and, by P4, this can be done by
LOCC.
Explicitly this would be done by player 1 measuringZ1 and
the remaining players {v2, . . . , vm} measuring Xi and com-
paring results to measureK#2 , . . . ,K#m, yielding ℓ22, . . . , ℓm2
8FIG. 4: (Color online) Distribution and access of information
{l12, . . . , ln2} for the n-GHZM state. The green arrows represent
uses of dependency Property P1. In (a) the dependency on l12 is
taken out of the set, and in (b) the dependency on l22 is shared across
the whole set. This encoded graph state gives an (n, n) secret sharing
scheme by setting l12 = S and the other bits can be set arbitrarily.
via eigenequations (3.12). Hence, in this case, LOCC is suffi-
cient for all possible information access.
Similarly Fig. 4(b) shows how P1 implies that the player
subset {v2, . . . , vm} depends on bits
l22 ⊕ ℓ32, ℓ22 ⊕ ℓ42, . . . , ℓ22 ⊕ ℓm2
only and, by P3 and P4, they can be accessed simultaneously
by LOCC alone. Explicitly this would be done by all players
measuring Xi. The players in this set then compare results to
measure
K#2 ·K#3 ,K#2 ·K#4 , . . .K#2 ·K#m. (4.1)
Only in the case that all players collaborate would there be
a difference between the LOCC and FQ cases; in this case
P4 implies that, by LOCC, the players can either access
ℓ22, . . . , ℓn2 or ℓ12. Obviously, for FQC, all information is
simultaneously accessible.
We see above that bit ℓ12 is only accessible when all play-
ers act together. By choosing the secret bit S as S = ℓ12 and
fixing all other ℓi2 arbitrarily, we obtain the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 2. An encoded nGHZM state with ℓ12 = S and
all other ℓi2 set to zero enables a (n, n) direct secret sharing
scheme that can be accessed via LOCC.
This case is depicted in Fig. 4.
Now we see that (3, 4) threshold secret sharing is attainable
with encoded graph states.
Proposition 3. The 4-qubit ring encoded graph state with
ℓ12 = ℓ22 = ℓ32 = ℓ42 = S enables a (3, 4) direct secret
sharing scheme, and LOCC between players suffices for de-
coding.
Proof. The 4-qubit ring state is depicted in Fig. 5. We see in
Fig. 5(a) that P1 shows that pairs {v1, v2}, {v2, v3}, {v3, v4}
and {v1, v4} are denied any information whatsoever.
Figure 5(b) shows that the player pair {v1, v3} can obtain,
and moreover can only obtain, ℓ12 ⊕ ℓ32. Similarly {v2, v4}
obtain, and only obtain, ℓ22 ⊕ ℓ42. Fig. 5(c) reveals that play-
ers {v1, v2, v3} obtain, and only obtain, ℓ22 and/or (by using
FQC/LOCC) ℓ12 ⊕ ℓ32.
Similarly, players {v2, v3, v4} obtain, and only obtain, ℓ32
and/or (via FQC/LOCC) ℓ22 ⊕ ℓ42. The remaining triplets
obtain, and only obtain, ℓ12 and/or (via FQC/LOCC) ℓ22 ⊕
ℓ42 in the case of {v1, v2, v4}, and ℓ42 and/or (FQC/LOCC)
ℓ12 ⊕ ℓ32 in the case of {v1, v3, v4}.
We see that this graph gives a (3,4) threshold scheme by
setting
ℓ12 = ℓ22 = ℓ32 = ℓ42 = S. (4.2)
Our final result in this subsection concerns the (3, 5) thresh-
old scheme, given by a 5-qubit ring depicted in Fig. 6.
Proposition 4. The five-qubit encoded RING graph state en-
ables (3, 5) threshold secret sharing for the CC protocol pro-
vided that ℓ12 = ℓ22 = ℓ32 = ℓ42 = ℓ52 = S, with LOCC
between players being sufficient for decoding.
Proof. Fig. 6(a) shows how P1 implies that players 1 and 2
cannot access any information because the dependency can be
taken away from them. Similarly it is easy to see that no pair
of players can access any information by application of P1.
On the other hand if three cyclic neighbours {vi, vj , vk} form
a set, P1 implies the set only depends on ℓj2; this is clear
from the case for the player set {v1, v2, v3} in Fig. 6(b). P2
implies the bit can be accessed, and P4 says this access can
be achieved via LOCC. Accessing would be accomplished by
measuring K#j , which is done by locally measuring Zi, Xj ,
Zk.
The remaining possible sets of three players are all similar
to the T shape in Fig. 6(c); in this case the set {vi, vj , vk}
depends only on ℓi2⊕ℓj2⊕ℓk2 by property P1. This is seen for
the example {v1, v2, v4} in Fig. 6(c). By properties P2 and P4
the players can access the secret by LOCC. Their procedure is
effected by measuring K#i ·K#j ·K#k , which is accomplished
locally by measuring Yi, Yj , Xk.
Any set of more than three players contains at least one of
these possibilities, and the players can therefore access the
same information. By choosing to encode the bit secret S as
ℓ12 = ℓ22 = ℓ32 = ℓ24 = ℓ52 = S, (4.3)
the proposition is proved.
Here we established three examples that use graph states
for secret sharing. These three examples demonstrate the sim-
ple properties of our approach, and more examples of graph
states for secret sharing could be found. In the next two sub-
sections, we extend these results and techniques to secret key
distillation and to sharing a quantum secret.
B. CQ
In this subsection we address case CQ, which corresponds
to the protocol expounded by Hillery, Buzˇek, and Berthiaume
9FIG. 5: (Color online) Application of P1 to the square encoded graph state. This graph gives a (3, 4) secret sharing scheme setting
ℓ1 = ℓ2 = ℓ3 = ℓ4 = S (see proposition 3).
FIG. 6: (Color online) Application of P1 to the 5-qubit ring encoded graph state to obtain a (3, 5) direct secret sharing scheme by setting
ℓ12 = ℓ22 = ℓ32 = ℓ42 = ℓ52 = S.
(HBB) for sending a classical secret with insecure quantum
channels between the dealer and players [2]. Actually this
problem can instead be solved by combining the classical se-
cret sharing protocol of Shamir [1] via standard quantum key
distribution (QKD) [8] to assure secure classical channels be-
tween the dealer and each of the players. In the QKD ap-
proach, the dealer would first establish a random key with
each of the players individually by using QKD. This would
enable perfectly secure classical communication between the
dealer and each player (as a one time pad), which can then be
used to perform the Shamir protocol safely. However, QKD
may not afford the most efficient approach hence the interest
in alternative schemes.
HBB [2] combine secret sharing protocols with QKD: the
dealer distributes multipartite states to share a secret key,
which can only be distilled by or shared with authorized sets
of players. This key can then be used to send any classical
message the dealer would wish to send to the authorized play-
ers, without any unauthorized parties having access to it. The
HBB approach can be more efficient in the number of uses of
quantum channels between dealer and players, which is com-
parable to the greater efficiency achieved by direct distillation
of multipartite entanglement rather than distillation of pairs
of maximally entangled states and complicated sequences of
teleportations [15]).
Another benefit is that the HBB approach can be extended
to sharing quantum secrets (QQ) as we see in the next subsec-
tion. HBB [2] created a classical threshold scheme for (2, 2)
and (3, 3) cases, and this has been extended to the (n, n) case
in [11].
We note that, as an extension of HBB, our protocol shares
the same drawbacks. The HBB protocol, hence ours, protects
against intercept-resend attacks but is not guaranteed to be se-
cure against other attacks [9]. Second, it only works for a
noiseless channel: In the case of a noisy channel, the HBB
protocol can not establish a key (as the noise will be mis-
taken for an eavesdropper). This problem is likely not fatal, as
approaches involving entanglement distillation or alternatives
could help to overcome the effects of noise in the channel [10].
Our protocol employs graph states to generalize the HBB
scheme [2]. By using graph states our scheme could build on
current experimental research for generating graph states for
measurement-based quantum computing [12]. Further, encod-
ing onto graph states allows us to use the properties developed
Sec. III to generalize to other access structures.
As an example we show how this approach generalizes
HBB’s protocol to the (3, 5) case, together with the (n, n)
case. Although other examples are not provided here, the
properties given in Sec. III B allow further exploration. In ad-
dition, our graph state shows how the HBB protocol can be
thought of as an extension to Gottesman’s results [14], in the
sense that HBB’s protocol can be regarded as a purification of
Gottesman’s.
The underlying concept for the protocol is simple. We use
an entangled state as the channel between the dealer D and n
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players. This will be a graph state; hence we can always write
in the following way (c.f. Sec. III C)
|G(~0)〉 =
1√
2
(
|0〉D|g(0···0)〉1,...,n
+ |1〉D|g(1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ND
0···0)〉1,...,n
)
=
eiπ/4√
2
(
|0′〉D|g′(0···0)〉1,...,n
− i|1′〉D|g′(1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ND
0...0)
〉1,...,n
)
. (4.4)
The dealer measures randomly in either the {|0〉D, |1〉D} or
the {|0′〉D, |1′〉D} basis. The dealer’s measurement outcomes
provide the random key.
Through the entanglement, the players can access the key
by making the correct measurement. If the dealer measures in
{|0〉D, |1〉D}, the results are then correlated to the states
{|g(0···0)〉1,...,n, |g(1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ND
0···0)〉1,...,n}
held by the players. If any set of players can discriminate
these states perfectly, they can find out what the measurement
result of the dealer was, and thereby obtain the random key.
The dealer may instead choose to measure in
the {|0′〉D, |1′〉D} basis, and then the player’s qubits
will end up in either of the associated conjugate states
{|g′(0···0)〉1,...,n, |g′(1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ND
0···0)
〉1,...,n}
correlated to the measurement result. The ability to discrim-
inate (or in other words, to access the information ~ℓ⋆2 and
hence get the key) is then determined by the conjugate graph
g′, which must be checked to have the correct access struc-
ture also (if we want to do secret sharing). We see that this
works for the GHZ and the 5-qubit ring encoded graph states,
but it does not work for the 4-qubit ring encoded graph state.
This is why we cannot extend the (3, 4) CC protocol to key
distribution in this way.
In the case of only one player, this corresponds to Ek-
ert’s protocol [16]. In our case there is the added struc-
ture given by the graph g. Discriminating these states is
the same as accessing either the information ~ℓ⋆2 = ~0 or
~ℓ⋆2 = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0). By choosing the right graph, only
the authorized players can access the information, or discrimi-
nate the states and access this key. In this first instance we use
exactly the graphs of the last protocols to do this. In this way
these entangled states (4.4) are a purification of the protocols
of the last section - taking a random choice of the two graph
states (which can be viewed as a mixed state) to an entangled
pure state by adding an auxiliary system, which is the dealer
in this case.
The players also measure randomly to either discriminate
states
{|g(0···0)〉1,...,n, |g(1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ND
0···0)〉1,...,n},
or the conjugate states
{|g′(0···0)〉1,...,n, |g′(1 · · ·1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ND
0···0)
〉1,...,n}.
As seen in Sec. III C these states are conjugate in the sense
that discriminating the states
{|g(0···0)〉1,...,n, |g(1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ND
0···0)〉1,...,n}
provides no information about whether we have
|g′(0···0)〉1,...,n
or
|g′
(1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ND
0···0)
〉1,...,n.
Thus, the players cannot discriminate both bases simultane-
ously, so even if a set of players is authorized and can discrim-
inate perfectly, 50% of the time they will measure in a basis
in which they gain no information about the dealer’s measure-
ment result, hence will not access the key. To accommodate
this at some point in the protocol, the dealer or players must
announce which basis they measure. Results where the bases
match are kept, and those that do not match are discarded. The
remaining results should be perfectly correlated and provide a
random key, often referred to as the ‘sifted key’. By standard
classical security protocols [3], this can be distilled to a secret
key by the dealer and authorised players sacrificing part of the
sifted key.
In this way our protocols are protected against a large class
of attacks, namely the so-called intercept-resend attacks. For
such attacks we imagine an eavesdropper (traditionally called
Eve) who tries to gain information about the secret key by in-
tercepting the qubits before they reach the players, and either
measuring them directly or entangling them to some ancilla
‘spy’-qubits of her own and then sending them on to the play-
ers. (In fact, this eavesdropper could instead be some unautho-
rized players.) At any point in the protocol Eve may measure
her entangled ancilla spy-qubits to attempt access to the key.
She will try to do this in a way that is not detectable by the
dealer and authorized players.
Measuring in two conjugate bases serves two complemen-
tary purposes to counter this particular class of attacks. First
the measurements in conjugate bases is decided randomly,
which protects against any intercept-resend eavesdropping
strategy: if Eve knows which measurement the players will
make, she can make the same measurement herself and thus
be undetected, but, if she does not know the measurement ba-
sis, then any intrusion by her will affect the statistics of sub-
sequent measurements and thus be detectable. Second, mea-
surement in conjugate bases allows checking of correlations
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FIG. 7: (Color online) CQ for (n,n). The dealer’s qubit is attached so
as to encode on the first qubit in the (n, n) scheme. As Eqs. (3.24)
and (4.5) indicate, if the authority measures the control qubit in X the
resulting graphs are those of Fig. 4. In the case of Y measurements,
the graphs transform to the right graph (b) (see text for explanation).
to verify that the global state indeed corresponds to the cor-
rect form (3.24), which proves that Eve has not entangled the
state to ancilla during its transit.
If the measurements are truly random, we can view them as
a kind of tomography of the state shared between the dealer
and players, and suppose that all results represent this state
faithfully. In fact these two purposes are not independent and
are related to the long history of using entanglement distilla-
tion to prove security for key distribution (e.g. [3]). In both
cases, the appropriate measurements are the stabilisers of the
state.
Our protocol runs as follows
CQ1 the dealer first prepares the state |g(0···0)〉1...n associated
to the corresponding CC secret sharing protocol, then
entangles extra qubits (known as the dealer’s qubits)
to each of the qubits upon which the secret is indepen-
dently distributed (see Figs. 7a) and 8a)).
CQ2 The dealer distributes to the players their qubits (and
keeps the dealer’s qubits).
CQ3 The dealer and the set of authorized players V′ measure
randomly one of a set of conjugate bases on their qubits
and announce they have measured on a public classical
channel.
CQ4 The set of players V′ trying to access the secret an-
nounce their measurement basis.
CQ5 The dealer announces her measurement basis.
CQ6 Classical security protocols follow establishing a secret
key between dealer and authorized set of players.
CQ7 The secret key is used to send the secret message.
Now we see how this works for the (n, n) case. The state
prepared by the dealer is that of the nGHZM state with an ex-
tra vertex attached to player 1’s qubit (CQ1); this extra vertex
corresponds to a qubit that is retained by the dealer as shown
in Fig. 7(a).
|G(~0)〉D,1,...,n =
(|0〉D|g(0···0)〉1,...,n
+ |1〉D|g(10···0)〉1,...,n
)
/
√
2
=(|0′〉D|g′(0···0)〉1,...,n
− i|1′〉D|g′(10···0)〉1,...,n)/
√
2. (4.5)
The stabilizers for state (4.5) are
K#D =XD ⊗ Z1 ⊗ 1 2 ⊗ 1 3 · · · ⊗ 1 n,
K#1 =ZD ⊗X1 ⊗ Z2 ⊗ Z3 · · · ⊗ Zn,
K#2 =1 D ⊗ Z1 ⊗X2 ⊗ 1 3 · · · ⊗ 1 n,
K#3 =1 D ⊗ Z1 ⊗ 1 2 ⊗X3 · · · ⊗ 1 n,
.
.
.
K#n =1 D ⊗ Z1 ⊗ 1 2 ⊗ 1 3 · · · ⊗Xn. (4.6)
The qubit corresponding to vertex D is retained by the the
dealer, and the others qubits are sent to the players (CQ2).
As prescribed by the protocol, the dealer measures in the Z
basis {|0〉D, |1〉D} or in the Y basis {|0′〉D, |1′〉D}, and
the players perform appropriate measurements to distinguish
|g(0···0)〉1,...,n from |g(10···0)〉1,...,n, or |g′(0···0)〉1,...,n from
|g′(10···0)〉1...n, respectively. Our arguments from the CC case
show that discriminating |g(0···0)〉1,...,n from |g(10···0)〉1,...,n
cannot be done by a subset of fewer than n players.
Similarly, we can apply properties P1-P4 from Sec. III B
to the conjugate graphs as shown in Fig. 7(b), to see that
the same holds trying to discriminate |g′(0···0)〉1,...,n from
|g′(10···0)〉1,...,n. The players have various choices of how to
perform both sets of discriminating measurements. Impor-
tantly, the measurements for g will be conjugate to those for
g′.
We choose the following measurement strategy. The dealer
chooses ZD or YD randomly, player one chooses X1 or Y1
randomly and the other players choose Zi or Yi randomly. We
will see that 50% of the time their measurements will coincide
to allow a shared key. That is, on half of the cases the ran-
domly chosen combination will be equivalent to performing a
suitable stabilzer measurement for which the dealer and play-
ers will share a perfect key, and also be able to check statistics
for security (CQ3). After the announcements of the measure-
ment bases, the dealer and the players can discard any results
where the bases do not match and are left with the sifted key
(CQ4,5).
To see this, first suppose that the dealer measures in the ZD
basis. The players can then obtain a secret key (i.e. discrim-
inate |g(0···0)〉1,...,n from |g(10···0)〉1,...,n) by measuring any
combination of a product of stabilizers for the subgraph g as
long as they include that of player 1’s vertex, which we de-
note k#1 (with lowercase for k indicating a stabilizer for the
subgraph rather than the graph).
As we can see by comparing the global state’s stabiliz-
ers (4.6) and the stabilizers of the subgraph (which can be
imagined by extending those of Eq. (3.17) to n parties), in-
cluding the ZD measurement of the dealer, the dealer plus
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the players are effectively measuring K#1 or any combina-
tion of the total graph’s stabilizers, including K#1 such as
K#1 · K#i · · ·K#n . Such stabilizer products corresponds to
local measurements where player 1 measures X1 and the re-
maining players measure Zi or Yi with an even number of
those who measure Yi; or player 1 measures Y1 and the re-
maining players measure Zi or Yi with an odd number mea-
suring Yi.
Similarly, if the dealer measures in the YD basis, the play-
ers can obtain a secret key by measuring the stabilizers of
the conjugate graph depicted in Fig. 7(b), k1 , or any prod-
uct including this stabilizer: k1 · k#i · · · k#n (discriminating
|g′(0···0)〉1,...,n from |g′(10···0)〉1,...,n). Including the measure-
ment by the dealer in the Y basis, this set of measurements
corresponds to the dealer plus the players measuring stabiliz-
ers K#D · K#1 or any combination of the graph’s stabilizers
including K#D · K#1 , such as K#D · K#1 · K#i · · ·K#n . This
set of stabilizer measurements corresponds to local measure-
ments where player 1 measures X1 and the remaining players
measure Zi or Yi, as long as there is an odd number of those
who measure Yi, or where player 1 measures Y1 and the re-
maining players measure Zi or Yi with an even number of
those who measure Yi.
Thus each combination of measurements X1 or Y1 by
player one, and Zi or Yi by the other players corresponds
to the correct measurement to discriminate the appropriate
encoded graph states either for the dealer measuring ZD or
YD. The dealer chooses randomly so, 50% of the time the
measurements will coincide and results be correlated. After
checking the bases match they throw away the cases they don’t
to give a sifted key.
As discussed above, the randomness of the measurement
bases ensures that any eavesdropper cannot know which mea-
surement to make, and so any interference she introduces will
be noticed by standard security checks (step CQ4,5,6) of the
protocol. In this case, the dealer and authorized players should
randomly choose a part of the sifted key (for example the
dealer picks randomly and announces to all the players), and
both the dealer and the authorized players announce their re-
sults.
They can then check that the results match those expected.
If they do, they are sure there has been no eavesdropper, and
that the key is secure. If the correlations do not match, they are
forced to throw away the key and start again. As in HBB [2]
the players announce their measurement results (CQ4) before
the dealer (CQ5) to prevent the players from cheating.
That matching results imply security is evident from the
fact that the random measurements can be seen as checking
the state as mentioned above. In this case, if measurements are
made randomly as described, each choice measures a different
set of stabilizers. Doing this asymptotically builds statistics
that give the expectation of all the stabilizer operators. If we
obtain the expected results, i.e. that the state is a +1 eigenstate
of operatorsK#D · · ·K#n in (4.6), then the state is by definition
that of (4.5) and hence not entangled to any possible eaves-
dropper so an eavesdropper is denied any information about
the key. We thus have the following proposition.
Proposition 5. The CC (n, n) scheme can be extended as
above to give secure distribution of shared random keys with
the same secrecy access structure. The secret key can be ac-
cessed by LOCC.
Let us now see how the (3, 5) can be extended to a secret
key distribution protocol. In this case, the state prepared by
the dealer is that of Fig. 8(a):
|G(~0)〉D12345 =(|0〉D|g(00000)〉12345
+ |1〉D|g(11111)〉12345)/
√
2
=(|0′〉D|g′(00000)〉12345
− i|1′〉D|g′(11111)〉12345)/
√
2. (4.7)
The stabilizers of this total state are
K#D =XD ⊗ Z1 ⊗ Z2 ⊗ Z3 ⊗ Z4 ⊗ Z5,
K#1 =ZD ⊗X1 ⊗ Z2 ⊗ 1 3 ⊗ 1 4 ⊗ Z5,
K#2 =ZD ⊗ Z1 ⊗X2 ⊗ Z3 ⊗ 1 4 ⊗ 1 5,
K#3 =ZD ⊗ 1 1 ⊗ Z2 ⊗X3 ⊗ Z4 ⊗ 1 5,
K#4 =ZD ⊗ 1 1 ⊗ 1 2 ⊗ Z3 ⊗X4 ⊗ Z5,
K#5 =ZD ⊗ Z1 ⊗ 1 2 ⊗ 1 3 ⊗ Z4 ⊗X5. (4.8)
As before, when the dealer measures in the Z basis, the fact
that the graph g is a (3, 5) direct threshold scheme means that
any pair of players cannot reveal the dealer’s results, hence
cannot access the key; in contrast any three collaborating play-
ers can reveal the key. As the conjugate g′ graph given by the
dealer measuring in the Y basis (see Fig. 8(b)) is just a re-
ordering of the original ring and replacing # →  vertices, it
is also a (3, 5) direct thresold scheme, so the same conclusions
hold.
Consider first the subset {v1, v2, v3}: as the dealer mea-
sures ZD, the players’ appropriate measurements correspond
to the direct (3, 5) protocol of the previous subsection. That
is, player 1 measures Z1, player 2 measures X2, and player 3
measures Z3. This protocol corresponds to players measur-
ing stabilizer k#2 of the induced subgraph (which is the ring
of Fig. 6), or the dealer plus the players measuring K#2 of the
total graph (Fig. 8(a)). If the dealer measures YD , the players’
appropriate measurements correspond to the direct (3, 5) pro-
tocol of the previous section, but changed slightly for the fact
that it is the conjugate graph.
By applying the properties of Sec. III B, we can see this can
be done by player 1 measuring X1, player 2 measuring Y2,
and player 3 measuring X3. This corresponds to measuring
stabilizer k1 · k2 · k3 of the induced conjugate graph, which
is the ring of Fig. 8(b), or the dealer plus the players measuring
K#D ·K#1 ·K#2 ·K#3 of the total graph shown in Fig. 8(a)).
We then have the dealer randomly measuring ZD or YD,
and the players randomly measuring in Z1, X2, Z3 or X1, Y2,
X3. As before, they communicate to get the sifted key first
(steps CQ4 and CQ5) in the protocol), and then follow the
security steps after that.
To observe that the protocol is secure, we study what these
measurements imply about the total state of the dealer and the
players {v1, v2, v3}. In step CQ5 of the protocol, some of the
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sifted key is sacrificed to verify that the measurement results
are those we expected, and if not we throw the key away. If
the expectation value ofK#2 is +1, and ofK#D ·K#1 ·K#2 ·K#3
is also +1, as can be verified by the players, this means that
the state of {vD, v1, v2, v3} is in the subspace of graph states{|g(0000)〉D123, |g(1100)〉D123, |g(1001)〉D123, |g(0101)〉D123} ,
of the subgraph {vD, v1, v2, v3} given by erasing all other ver-
tices and edges. This also means that there are no correlations
between the dealer and any possible eavesdropper. This can
be seen as follows.
Given the established subspace, any global state of
{vD, v1, v2, v3} and the environment E (which may include
any eavesdropper) can be written
α|0〉E |g(0000)〉D123 + β|1〉E |g(1100)〉D123
+ δ|2〉E |g(1001)〉D123 + γ|3〉E |g(0101)〉D123.
(4.9)
The reduced density matrix of the environment and the dealer
can be easily calculated, using Eq. (3.24), thereby giving
ρE ⊗ 1 /2D, (4.10)
where ρE is the reduced density matrix of the environment.
Thus we see that the mutual information between the environ-
ment and the dealer is zero; hence any environment, including
a possible eavesdropper, can have no information about the
key.
Now consider players {v1, v3, v4}. If the dealer measures
ZD, the direct (3, 5) protocol tells us that the players should
measureX1, Y3, Y4, which corresponds to the players measur-
ing the stabilizer product k#1 ·k#3 ·k#4 of the subgraph (Fig. 6),
or the dealer plus the players measuring K#1 · K#3 · K#4 of
the total graph Fig. 8(a). If the dealer measures in the YD ba-
sis, by considering the discrimination of the conjugate graph
states Fig. 8(b), the players should measure Y1, Z3, Z4. Such
a measurement protocol corresponds to measuring the stabi-
lizer k1 of the conjugate graph Fig. 8(b), for the dealer plus
the players measuring K#D ·K#1 of the total graph Fig. 8(a).
Again the players and the dealer should follow steps CQ4
and CQ5 to obtain the sifted key and then compare some re-
sults for the security analysis in step CQ6. If the expectation
value of K#1 ·K#D is +1, and of K#1 ·K#3 ·K#4 is +1, the state
of {vD, v1, v3, v4} is in the subspace
{|g(0000)〉D134, |g(0011)〉D134, |g(1110)〉D134, |g(1101)〉D134}
of the subgraph {vD, v1, v3, v4} given by erasing all other ver-
tices and edges. Again, any state between the environment and
the dealer and players {v1, v3, v4}, which has support only
in this subspace, necessarily has no correlations between the
dealer and the environment. Thus again the environment can
not get any information about the secret key.
Any set of three players can be covered by these two cases,
simply by relabeling the players. We thus have the following
proposition.
FIG. 8: (Color online) CQ for (3, 5). The dealer’s qubit is attached
so as to encode on all five qubits correlated for the (3, 5) scheme. As
Eq. (4.7) indicates, if the dealer measures her qubit in X the resulting
graph is that of Fig. 6(a). In the case of Y measurements the graph
transform to the right graph (b).
Proposition 6. The CC (3, 5) scheme can be extended as
above to give secure distribution of shared random keys with
the same secrecy access structure. The secret key can be ac-
cessed by LOCC.
Remark. As it stands, this protocol is not resilient to noise.
Since noise (for example in the channel between the dealer
and players) could interfere with the results of the measure-
ment results in the sifted key, any noise would be seen as a po-
tential eavesdropper and so the sifted key would be discarded.
In fact this is a problem of the original HBB protocol also, and
was resolved in [10] by relating the problem to the distillation
of the initial entangled state between the dealer and the play-
ers. We expect that the same approach would work for our
generalized protocol. In the case of (n, n) this seems a simple
extension. However, for the (3, 5) case and possible further
graph state bases secret sharing schemes, it would be more
subtle and the distillation would be to subspaces with guaran-
teed security rather than to specific states, reflecting the more
complicated security analysis. The large body of work on dis-
tilling graph states should prove very useful to this aim (see
for example [6] and references therein). This is a topic of
ongoing work.
C. QQ
We now see how one more extension can be made to allow
for the sharing of quantum secrets. Here we are addressing
the third scenario presented in the introduction QQ, namely
sending a quantum secret in the possible presence of an eaves-
dropper. Our approach will be to use the same entangled state
as for the key distribution protocol to teleport the secret quan-
tum state across from the dealer to the set of players, where
the structure of the graph will again imply the secrecy struc-
ture. This teleportation extension is also that used in [2], but
here we extend it to general graph state protocols and explic-
itly show it for the (n, n) and the (3, 5) threshold schemes.
Although we do not present as general a result as those
in [4], where any (k, n) scheme is shown to be possible,
our graph state cases are nevertheless interesting for several
reasons. First, they represent a unification of secret sharing
schemes of [2, 4, 14] via the graph state formalism, second
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they use only qubits rather than higher dimensional systems
as in [4], which has advantages in that they are more easily
implementable at present. Third the schemes here are explic-
itly written and easy to understand and finally they are written
in terms of graph states which are of particular practical inter-
est across quantum information and will be extendible to the
embedded protocols of the next section.
Here we should note that because we are sending a quan-
tum secret (that is, a secret quantum state), all players cannot
simultaneously obtain the secret if only one is provided, since
this would violate no-cloning [4]. We say a set of players can
access the secret if it sits coherently within the space of their
qubits, in a way they know. In this way with access to full
quantum channels it can be localised to wherever they choose.
In the case of only classical channels between the players,
it may not be possible to localise information at all, and if it
is we must choose a site to which they will localise the secret.
In each case we discuss where it can be localised if possible
by LOCC only.
The protocol operates as follows
QQ1 The dealer prepares a secrecy graph state as in the CQ
key distribution protocol.
QQ2 The dealer performs a Bell measurement on the qubit
D and her input secret qubit |S〉in, and performs the
appropriate correction operation.
QQ3 The dealer distributes to the players their qubits.
QQ4 Authorised sets of players access the secret by mak-
ing prescribed measurements and corrections to focus
down the information to one of the authorized parties.
This may require global operations by authorized play-
ers (requiring quantum channels).
Let us see how this works. After step QQ1 the dealer pos-
sesses the encoded graph state |G(~0)〉D,1,...,n and the input
quantum secret |S〉in = α|0〉in + β|1〉in. We can see what
the resultant state of the players will be after step QQ2 by
rewritting the state in the Bell basis
|B00〉 :=(|00〉+ |11〉)/
√
2,
|B01〉 :=(|00〉 − |11〉)/
√
2,
|B10〉 :=(|01〉+ |10〉)/
√
2,
|B11〉 :=(|01〉 − |10〉)/
√
2, (4.11)
as follows.
|S〉in|G(~0)〉D,1,...,n =1/4(|B00〉in,D(α|g(0···0)〉1,...,n + β|g(1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ND
0···0)〉1,...,n
+ |B01〉in,D(α|g(0···0)〉1,...,n − β|g(1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ND
0···0)〉1,...,n
+ |B10〉in,D(α|g(1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ND
0···0)〉1,...,n + β|g(0···0)〉1,...,n
+ |B11〉in,D(α|g(1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ND
0···0)〉1,...,n − β|g(0···0)〉1,...,n). (4.12)
This can be seen using Eq. (3.24). After obtaining result Bij
corresponding to Bell state |Bij〉, the correction operator
U(i, j)1,...,n := ⊗a∈NcZii ·K#ja∈Nc , (4.13)
brings the resultant state to the desired encoded secret state
|Sg〉 = α|g(0···0)〉1,...,n + β|g(1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈NC
0···0)〉1,...,n. (4.14)
In fact, Eq. (4.14) is analogous to the direct encoding ap-
proach of [4, 14], where a state is encoded directly onto a
stabilizer space, or codespace. Again [4, 14] is more general
than ours in that it covers all (k, n), but again our scheme has
the advantage of being set on qubits and explicilty and simply
written down (where as in [4, 14] it is done with high dimen-
sional stabilizer codes via error correction codes and is not
readily understandable in terms of states).
To determine the access structure, that is to see if a set of
players can access the secret, we study the reduced density
matrix. From Eq. (4.14), it is clear that same adversary struc-
ture (i.e. the sets of players who cannot access the secret) as
in the CQ case cannot access the secret perfectly here. For
example, by setting either α = 0 or β = 0 in Eq. (4.14), we
can apply directly the dependency properties (c.f. Sec. III B).
However, it is possible that some some information (though
not perfect) may be obtained because of the cross-over terms
in the reduced density matrix. In addition, the access of infor-
mation can no longer be checked using previous methods, as
it is quantum not classical and different rules can apply (such
as no-cloning). In other words, we also have to check whether
the quantum secret state is coherently placed within the re-
duced density matrix, and if it is, whether it can be localized
by LOCC.
This requirement illustrates the difference between sharing
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classical and quantum secrets as discussed in detail by Gottes-
man [14]. We will see that, for the (n, n) threshold schemes,
the access structure remains the same as for the CQ case, al-
though the adversary structure can be significantly different
(indeed any individual player can access some information
about the secret). For the (3, 5) threshold scheme both the
access and adversary structure remain the same. For a more
general approach to the question of access, links to the flow
conditions for determinism in measurement-based quantum
computation [17] are quite useful, as we see in our example
below. We leave this to later work and for now concentrate on
these two examples.
In the (n, n) case the initial state prepared by the dealer
is the same as that for the key distilation protocol, shown in
Fig. 7(a). After the teleportation steps QQ2 and QQ3, the
players share the state
|Sg〉1,...,n = α|g(0···0)〉1,...,n + β|g(10···0)〉1,...,n, (4.15)
encoding the quantum secret. The fact that any set of n − 1
players cannot access the secret perfectly follows from the
dependency property from Sec. III B applied to the graph g,
which, as in the case of the key distribution protocol, means
the states |g(~0)〉 and |g(10···0)〉 appear locally identical to any
such set, and thus implies they cannot read the secret perfectly.
However, the cross over terms in the reduced density matrix
means that any subset of players (including a single player)
can access some information. For a set of players A, the re-
duced density matrix is of the form
ρA(S) =
|α+ β|2
2
|0¯〉〈0¯|+ |α− β|
2
2
|1¯〉〈1¯|, (4.16)
where |0¯〉, |1¯〉 are computational basis states over A (up to
local Hadamards). Thus, for secret states |S〉in lying on the
Z − Y plane of the Bloch sphere, all reduced states look the
same; hence no information can be gained in this case. How-
ever, for other states, some information can be obtained. For
example, any single player could distinguish perfectly the two
secret states |S〉in = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/
√
2.
On the other hand by teleportation the secret state is coher-
ently shared by all players, hence if acting all together, the
players can access the secret perfectly, and can certainly lo-
calise it to any chosen player by using quantum channels. If
restricted to LOCC, they can in fact, also localise the secret
onto any player. First we consider localising it to any player
other than player 1. We can see this explicitly if rewrite the
corresponding state (4.14) using (3.24) in the following way
|Sg〉1,...,n =α|g(0···0)〉1,...,n + β|g(10···0)〉1,...,n
=|g(0···0)〉1,...,n/i(α|0〉i + β|1〉i) (4.17)
+ |g(10···0)〉1,...,n/i(β|0〉i + α|1〉i);
thus if player 1 measures X and the remaining players ex-
cept player i measure Z , they can push the quantum state onto
player i’s qubit. To push the secret state onto player 1, it is
enough for the remaining players to measure in the Z basis
(and of course communicate their result to player 1), as can
be seen by rewriting the state as
|Sg〉1,...,n =α|g(0···0)〉1,...,n + β|g(10···0)〉1,...,n
=
∑
m2⊕...⊕mn=0
|m2 . . .mn〉2,...,n(α|+〉1 + β|−〉1) +
∑
m2⊕...⊕mn=1
|m2 . . .mn〉2,...,n(α|−〉1 + β|+〉1), (4.18)
where mi is a bit and |m2 . . .mn〉2,...,n is a product of Pauli
Z eigenstates.
We can see this another way, which may give hints of a pos-
sible way to check accessibility in more general cases. This
starts from noting that Eq. (4.14) as having arisen from an-
other scheme, not teleportation, analogous to the error cor-
recting schemes in [18], uniting these approaches. To do
this the dealer entangles the secret state |S〉 onto vertex 1 of
the nGHZM state directly and measures it in the Z basis. By
making the appropriate correction (based on the measurement
outcome), the resultant state is that of (4.14).
Incidently, we notice that our five party scheme is the same
graph as the 5-qubit code in [18], which is perhaps not so sur-
prising, since sharing a threshold scheme for quantum secrets
is necessarily an error correcting scheme (though not the other
way round) as pointed out in [4, 14]. Indeed this example ap-
pears in [4, 14] (although established in a different way).
Viewing Eq. (4.15) as having arisen in this way, we can
imagine the state of the secret qubit entangled to the nGHZM
state as the start of a measurement based computation with the
secret qubit as the input. We then choose any one player as an
output and application of the Flow conditions [17, 19] give an
explicit way to direct the secret onto any one of the players’
qubits by LOCC.
We thus have the following proposition.
Proposition 7. The CQ (n, n) scheme can be extended as
above to give quantum secret sharing schemes with a weaker
access structure: any fewer than n players cannot access the
secret perfectly, although they may access some information,
and all n players working together can access the secret per-
fectly. The secret can be localised onto any one of the autho-
rized players by LOCC.
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We note that the impossibility of achieving the (n, n)
threshold scheme follows directly from Ref. [4] as this is a
pure state scheme in their terms. However, it has recently been
shown to be possible, using a mixed state scheme by Broad-
bent et al [23], which can be understood as a classical mixing
over the scheme above, so that any sets of players fewer than
n see no information.
In the (3, 5) threshold case, we will see that the threshold
access structure carries through. The dealer starts with the
state of Fig. 8(a). After teleportation steps ii) and iii) in the
protocol, the players have the state
|Sg〉12345 = α|g(00000)〉12345 + β|g(11111)〉12345. (4.19)
It can easily be checked that the reduced density matrices of
any sets of fewer than three players are identical for all α,
β, hence they cannot access any information about the secret
qubit.
The ability for three users to access the secret qubit can be
seen to follow from the fact that it is also a two qubit erasure
error correcting scheme [18]. In general this is not LOCC. We
can see how this works explicitly writing the state,
|Sg〉12345 =α|g(00000)〉12345 + β|g(11111)〉12345
=1/4(|B00〉13(α|+〉2 + β|−〉2)|B01〉45
+ |B01〉13(α|+〉2 − β|−〉2)|B10〉45
+ |B10〉13(α|−〉2 − β|+〉2)|B00〉45
+ |B11〉13(α|−〉2 + β|+〉2)|B11〉45), (4.20)
where |±〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 ± |1〉). It is clear that if either pair,
{v1, v3} or {v4, v5} measure in the Bell basis, they can local-
ize the quantum secret onto player 2’s qubit by telling her the
result. After the Bell measurements, player 2’s qubit will be
projected into one of four possible states as seen above, which
can be brought to |S〉2 by the appropriate correction operation
depending on the result (this will consist of a local Hadamard
and possibly local X and Z flips). Similarly any set of three
players can localize the secret onto one of their number by two
getting together and performing a Bell measure. This leads to
the following proposition.
Proposition 8. The CQ (3, 5) scheme can be extended as
above to give quantum secret sharing schemes with the same
secrecy access structure. The secret can be localised onto one
of the players in an authorized set using quantum channels.
In [4] it is shown that there can exist no (3,4) QSS scheme
using pure states - hence it is clear there is no way to extend
the (3, 4) scheme in this way. This intriguingly coincides with
the fact that we cannot see how to do a CQ for (3, 4) and may
indicate a more fundamental connection.
V. EMBEDDED PROTOCOLS
We now present an example of an embedded protocol. That
is, we embed the (n, n) protocols of the previous section into
a larger graph, taking advantage of the fact that graph states
are extremely useful for various quantum information tasks.
The setting we imagine is where a quantum network is en-
visaged comprising of graph states, and we would like to do
secret sharing on some sub-network of the total network. This
may occur as a protocol in its own right or as part of a more
involved protocol, possibly involving error correction and or
MBQC.
We do this via a simple extension of a n-party GHZ states,
which we call a n-GHZ tree state, depicted in Fig. 9.
Definition 8. A n-GHZ tree state is any state where there is
an nGHZM state embedded inside another graph, attached by
any of the vertices except v1.
We now imagine a situation where the dealer hands out this
state to be shared by the players {v1, . . . , vn} and the rest of
the network, in this case the neighours N2, . . . ,Nn (which
may overlap). We then ask, can we still use this state to do the
secret sharing protocols of the last three sections. We find that
we can, starting with the following proposition.
Proposition 9. For all n-GHZ trees of (see Fig. 9), the bit
S = l12 forms an embedded (n, n) direct CC classical secret
sharing scheme (within the subgroup of players {v1, . . . , vn}).
This is true independent of the form of all possible sets of
neighboursNi (including overlapping).
The protocol would run as in the case of Sec. IV A, with the
secret being encoded onto the bit S = l12 on the n-GHZ tree.
The validity of the proposition above can be seen since l12
can, and only can, be read by all n of the subset of {1, . . . , n}
players together. This requirement is implied by simple ap-
plication of the dependency and access properties, which are
unaffected by the addition of neighbours in this case. How-
ever, there is a subtlety introduced if the neighbours of one of
the players may help.
For example, if a neighbour of player 2, say vj ∈ N2, who,
for simplicity’s sake we say only neighbours 2 and no one
else, the secret S = l12 can be read by the players
{v1, v3, v4, .., vn, vj}
since they can measureK#1 ·K#j∈N2 (as it is nontrivial only on
those players’ systems). Thus they can find l12⊕lj2 = S with-
out player 2. However, when not allowing for the help of the
neighbours, and only allowing players in the set {v1, . . . , vn}
to act together, all n must co-operate to find the secret, hence
it acts as an (n, n) threshold scheme.
This would not work for the square (3, 4) or (3, 5) schemes
since the secret is shared amongst all the players, so attaching
neighbours to any would spread it out and hence it could not
be found without measuring the neighbours also, by P2.
This embedded structure can also be extended to key dis-
tribution and quantum secret sharing. As in the (n, n) key
distribution case the total state is made by taking the CC case
and attaching a vertex to player 1, which is kept by the dealer.
In the case of the n-GHZ tree state, the total state of dealer,
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FIG. 9: (Color online) n-GHZ tree state. Ni represents the neigh-
bours of qubit vi (minus v1), and they are allowed to overlap. This
state gives a (n, n) secret sharing schemes for qubits 1 to n (see
propositions 9, 10 and 11).
players and neighbours is given by
|G(~0)〉D,1,...,n,N2..Nn
=(|0〉D|g(0···0)〉1,...,nN2..Nn
+ |1〉D|g(10···0)〉1,...,nN2..Nn)
=
eiπ/4√
2
(|0′〉D|g′(0···0)〉1,...,nN2..Nn
− i|1′〉D|g′(10···0)〉1,...,nN2..Nn). (5.1)
The protocol would then run as in Sec. IV B, using this
state. As explained above, if players {v1, . . . , vn} work to-
gether, they can discriminate
|g(′)(0···0)〉1,...,nN2..Nn
and
|g(′)(10···0)〉1,...,nN2..Nn
because they can measure k#,1 as they only have support on
{v1, . . . , vn}. Hence they can access the key. With the dealer
and the players these measurements correspond to measuring
stabilizers K#1 and K#D ·K#1 of the total graph (that of Fig. 9
with the dealer attached to vertex 1). Again, from the de-
pendency arguments P1 any subset of {v1, . . . , vn} cannot,
though again, the same subtleties hold regarding the help of
the neighbours.
With regards to security against an eavesdropper, unfortu-
nately we cannot check all stabilizers in here as we did in
the (n, n) case, since the remaining stabilizers have support
outside qubits {1, . . . , n}. However, we can check that it re-
mains in a secure subspace, as for the (3, 5) case in Sec. IV B.
Let h denote the subgraph induced by removing all neigh-
bouring sets {Ni} from Fig. 9 plus a dealer vertex attached
to v1 (giving the graph as in Fig. 7(a)), and |h~ℓ⋆2〉 the asso-
ciated encoded graph state. If the expectation values of K#1
and K#D · K#1 are both +1 (as can be checked be sacrificing
part of the sifted key), then we can be sure that the state of the
dealer and players {v1 . . . vn} are in the subspace{
|h
00~η
(2,...,n)
⋆2
〉D1,...,n
}
.
That is, in the subspace such that the first two entries of the
bit string are zero, and the remaining n− 1 elements are free,
which we denote with bit string
~η
(2,...,n)
⋆2
(i.e., the subspace spanned by all such bit strings).
If we now call p the graph after also removing the dealer’s
qubit (i.e. the nGHZM graph), the complete state of the
dealer, players {v1 . . . vn}, and any environmentE (including
the neighbours and possible eavesdropper) can therefore be
written as
|Ψ〉ED1,...,n =2−1/2
∑
~η
(2,...,n)
⋆2
α
~η
(2,...,n)
⋆2
(|0〉D|p0~η(2,...,n)⋆2 〉1,...,n
+ |1〉D|p1~η(2,...,n)⋆2 〉1, . . . , n
)|~η(2,...,n)⋆2 〉E ,
(5.2)
where the summation is over the bit string ~η(2,...,n)⋆2 . Tracing
out all the players, we have that the state of the dealer and
the environment is ρE ⊗ 1 /2D; thus we see that the mutual
information between the environment and the dealer is zero.
Hence, on the condition that the value of K#1 and K
#
D ·
K#1 are both found to be +1, any environment, including a
possible eavesdropper, can have no information about the key.
If the measurement results do not satisfy this condition, they
should be discarded as in Sec. IV B. Thus, we thus have the
following proposition.
Proposition 10. For all n-GHZ trees of n qubits (see Fig. 9),
attaching the dealer’s qubit to vertex v1 forms an embedded
(n, n) key distribution QC secret sharing scheme (within the
subgroup of players {v1, . . . , vn}). This is true independent
of the form of all possible sets of neighbours Ni (including
overlapping).
We can also see how to extend this embedded protocol to
sharing a quantum secret. As in Sec. IV C, the dealer uses
the state of the key distillation protocol, in this case (5.1), to
teleport the secret qubit onto the player’s qubits giving the
encoded state dealt to the players and their neighbours
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|Sg〉1,...,n,N2..Nn =α|g(0···0)〉1,...,n,N2,...,nn + β|g(10···0)〉1,...,n,N2,...,nn
=
∑
m2⊕···⊕mn=0
|m2 . . .mn〉2,...,n|N~m⋆2〉N2...Nn (α|+〉1 + β|−〉1)
+
∑
m2⊕···⊕mn=1
|m2 . . .mn〉2,...,n|N~m⋆2〉N2...Nn (α|−〉1 + β|+〉1) , (5.3)
with N the subgraph of the set {N2 . . .Nn}, |N~m⋆2〉N2...Nn
the associated encoded graph state, and bit string ~m⋆2 is a
function of bit values {m2, . . . ,mn}.
From this it is clear that if players {v2, . . . , vn} measure
in the Z basis, they project the state of player 1’s qubit onto
eitherα|+〉1+β|−〉1 orα|−〉1+β|+〉1 if the total parity is odd
or even respectively. These can be taken to the original secret
state |S〉1 by the action of correction operator U even1 = H1 for
even parity, and U odd1 = H1Z1 for odd parity. Again we have
a weaker version of the condition for the adversary structure.
The dependency rule P1 means that any less than the complete
set from the set of players v1, . . . , vn cannot access the secret
perfectly, but any single player can access some information.
Thus we have the following proposition illustrated in Fig. 9.
Proposition 11. For all n-GHZ trees of n qubits attaching
the dealer’s qubit to vertex v1 forms an embedded weak (n, n)
QQ quantum secret sharing scheme with the same adversary
and access structures as Proposition 7 (within the subgroup
of players {v1, . . . , vn}). This is true independent of the form
of all possible sets of neighboursNi (including overlapping).
The QQ is perhaps the most useful of the embedded proto-
cols as it could readily be seen as part of an extended network,
for example, the input to our protocol could occur as an out-
put of some previous MBQC, and the output of our protocol
could be the input to a subsequent computation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have seen that graph states are a good resource giving a
unified approach to secret sharing of both quantum and classi-
cal secrets, in the presence of an eavesdropper. The protocols
presented can be clearly understood from simple properties of
classical information on graph states we have showed. In par-
ticular this gives a new way to generate protocols of address-
ing the second situation, that of sharing a quantum secret in
the presence of eavesdropper, beyond (n, n) for the first time.
Explicilty we have presented the case of a (3, 5) secret shar-
ing protocol for such a setting. Further we have introduced
so-called embedded secret sharing protocols as a first step to
integrated quantum networks.
A natural question to ask next is how far can these ideas be
pushed and which (k, n) can be covered. This then becomes
a graph theoretic relabeling problem - where the labels are the
secrets (more precisely the encoding of the secrets), and their
access given by our rules. We expect that this way will re-
sult in many cases. However, we know that directly not all
(k, n) cases can be solved. We can see for example that it is
impossible to do a (3, 2) direct secret sharing scheme with a
graph state using our protocol. This can be seen easily, firstly
by noticing that demanding single individuals get no informa-
tion means all three must be entangled. Then we have two
options, either the 3-GHZM, or the fully connected graph. In
both cases it is easy to see that there is no way to choose an
encoding of secret S onto the ℓi2 such that all three pairings
depend on it simultaneously (thus, they cannot all access it).
The application of the graphical properties presented to this
problem is an ongoing area of investigation.
We can also ask is it possible to extend the protocols in this
work somehow to cover these cases which currently cause dif-
ficulty. One such extension may be possible via the connec-
tion between the sharing of quantum and classical secrets we
have seen in our protocols. In [4] solutions to the general
(k, n) sharing of a quantum secret were provided via connec-
tions made to error correction.
Although we arrived at our QQ from a different ap-
proach,not related to error correction, they can be thought of
as stabilizer codes, so relating to those of [4], since all stabi-
lizer codes can be thought of as graph codes [18]. A benefit of
our approach is that we have been able to use intuitive graph-
ical ideas to prove which players can access which informa-
tion. Perhaps extending to higher dimensional graph states,
we would be able to recapture the results of [4] for the most
general case seems likely to be possible for sharing quantum
secrets. The next step would be to translate this to the key
distribution protocol, which would be possible via the con-
nections shown here.
As we have mentioned, there is also the outstanding ques-
tions of security for these protocols. Here we have seen se-
curity against certain classes of attacks, as in HBB [2]. The
question of security for secret sharing is a large problem of
current interest [20–22]. Another problem raised was that
of noisy channels as it stands our protocol is not resilient to
noise. This was also a problem for HBB, and it seems likely
that the same approach used in [10] can be used to address
both these problems, that is via connection with entanglement
distillation. To this end the wealth of results on entanglement
distillation for graph states [6] will help push this direction
further.
We hope that this work will enable the integration of differ-
ent quantum information protocols, for example secret com-
puting. perhaps the most interesting property of these schemes
is their integratability. As quantum technologies become more
accessible in the real world, it is likely that in a real network
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setting we would like to do combinations of tasks, without
having to change and swap hardware. The embedded proto-
cols here are a first step towards this goal, and we hope these
ideas can pave the way for more integrated schemes.
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